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PRINCIPAL" DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE REAL 
ESTATE BROKER AND SALESl\iAN ARE INVOLVED IN 
TRANSACTION. 
POINT 5. 
THE RIGHT TO CLAIM AN ELECTION IS WAIVED 
BY FAILURE TO DEMAND AN ELECTION IN LOWER 
COURT. 
POINT 6. 
THE QUESTION OF "ELECTION" CANNOT BE RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
POINT 7. 
IF THE FOREGOING ARE NOT PERSUASIVE, THEN 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOW BE GIVEN THE RIGHT 
TO "ELECT" TO PROCEED AS TO KETCHUM. 
POINT 8. 
ASSUMING THAT STEVENS HAD NOT RECEIVED 
PAYMENT, BUT HAD COMPLETED THE DEAL, AND 
THEN SENT KETCHUM ALL PAPERS, COULD KETCHUM 
RECOVER COMMISSION ON SALE? 
Appellant feels that the 'Court did not give sufficient 
consideration to these basic facts : 
·Plaintiff had dealt with Stevens before in the sale 
of the same property, while he was salesman for Gaddis. 
This transaction went through without problems. She 
dealt with him as salesman here, and not as an indi-
vidual. 
Stevens did exactly what Ketchum hired him to do, 
find and bring together seller and buyer, get papers 
signed, so as to collect a commission. 
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3 
At all times Stevens was a licensed real estate sales-
man working under Ketchum as broker. Ketchum hired 
him, obtanied his license, and vouched for his integrity. 
Paintiff, in good faith, paid Stevens $468.32:. 
Plaintiff, of all three, was the innocent party. 
Stevens admittedly was a thief and a scoundrel, and 
absconded with the money. 
Ketchum hired him, Ketchum vouched for him in 
obtaining his license, Ketchum made it possible for him 
to go forth armed with a license, bearing the seal of the 
great state of Utah, to accomplish his theft or embezzle-
ment. 
Plaintiff was certainly the innocent party, who 
under Judge Ellett's decision, and this Court's decision, 
was made the victim. 
The judgment granted against Stevens is ce-rtainly 
a worthless piece of paper, he is apparently judgment 
proof and out of this Court's jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff has never had her day in 'Court, the matter 
having be·en determined at p·re-trial. 
The substance of the case so far as justice is con-
cerned is that our Courts say to Brokers, "Hire who you 
please, we will not hold you responsible, unless the victim 
can prove you knew all about it." To a real estate sales-
man, the Court says "We support you in your skull-
dugge-ry, steal if you can, we will give judgment against 
you. But if the custorner wants to hold your broker, he 
must 'elect' the broker, and turn you loose." 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
To the· innocent party - "Sorry, you should have 
been more cautious, and it was your duty in dealing with 
a licensed salesman, to demand to know his broker, and 
deal with the broker." 
The foregoing js not intended to question the 'Court's 
integrity or ability, but an effort on Appellant's attorney 
to forcefully· draw to the ·Court's attention the unfairness 
of the ruling. 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE FACTS. 
Quoting from the decision, "She took judgment 
against Stevens, and the lower Court dismissed the 
action a.s to Ketchum. The Plaintiff chose to retain heT 
judgment against Stevens, but appealed to this Court, 
seeking to charge Ketchum also. 
The record shows that Stevens filed a general denial 
September 19, 1963. On February 10, 1964, his attorney 
Vernon ·J. Langlois, filed his "\vithdrawal. On May 29, 
1964, made a minute entry, as to Stevens "Answer 
stricken, PI. given judgment as prayed." :The judgment 
as to Stevens "\vas prepared by Tygesen, and signed by 
Judge Ellett, June 30, 1964. One month after the judg-
ment was signed as to Ketchum. 
The judgment as to Ketchum, dismissing the case, 
was prepared by Draper, and signed by Judge Ellett 
June 1, 1964. At the request of Plaintiff, "FINDINGS" 
were prepared by Dr a peT and signed by Judge Ellett, 
June 8, 1964. 
The pre-trial occurred l\{ay 29, 1964. Stevens nor 
his attorney did not appear. The Court made its ruling 
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as to Ketchum. Later that day, Judge Ellett, in order 
to complete the case, made its minute entry as to ~Stevens. 
The disposition as to Ketchum was made first, the 
one as to Stevens, an afterthought. The decision would 
infer judgment was first had as to Stevens. 
The question of an ~'ELE'C.T'ION" was never raised 
in the lower Court, and the statement in the opinion 
"Such an election has been made in this case," as a 
matter of fact never occurred. 
No election was ever made by Plaintiff, and the 
question was never considered in the lower 'Court, nor 
did Judge Ellett make his decision on that point. 
POINT 2. 
THAT PLAINTIFF MADE NO ELECTION IN LOWER 
COURT. 
All during the proceedings, pleadings, memoran-
dums, brief, and argument before this Court, Plaintiff 
proceeded on the theory that both principal and agent 
were liable. 
All of D,efendant Ketchum's pleadings, interroga-
tories, briefs, "Findings" and "decree" related to the 
point that P1aintiff did not rely on Ketchum, and Ket-
chum had no knowledge. 
Not once did there appear a demand for an election, 
nor that an election had been made. 
POINT 3. 
COSTELLO VS. KASTLER DISTINGUISHABLE. 
In the Costello case, the agent was actually a buyer 
of minerals for processing mill. There was no way 
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Plaintiff could have known of agency, there was no 
statute involved. 
The ~Costello case relies heavily on 118 A.L.R. 682, 
which was a case where the owner transferred his stock 
on the books to the agent's name. Here there was a clear 
intent to keep the principal secret. The third party in 
making an investigation could not have ascertained the 
principal-agent relation. 
In the Costello case, the ·Court cites LOVE VS. s:T. 
JOSE.PH STO~CK YARDS, et al, 169 Pacific 9·51. In 
that case the agent was acting as agent for ~Stock yards, 
but did not reveal principal. The Plaintiff had no way 
of discovering the principal. 
POINT 4. 
THAT REAL ESTATE BROKER STATUTE ESTAB-
LISHES PRINCIPAL AND AGENT RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN BROKER AND SALESMAN, AND "UNDISCLOSED 
PRINCIPAL" DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE REAL 
ESTATE BROKER AND SALESMAN ARE INVOLVED IN 
TRANSACTION. 
Plaintiff's position is that the point as to "UNDIS-
CL·OS~ED: PRINiCIPAlL?' should not apply to any trans-
action where real estate Broker and real estate sales-man 
are parties, since that statute as to real estate brokers 
must be read into each of such transactions, and by that 
statute, principal and agent relationship is established, 
and there can he no such thing as an undisclosed princi-
pal. In our case, there was no effort to conceal from 
Wilkerson the relationship with Ketchum and Stevens. 
Had ·Stevens attempted to conceal the relationship·, it 
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7 
was a public record at the State Capitol, Ketchum's 
office displayed Stevens' license, every county clerk was 
furnished a report showing Stevens was agent for Ket-
chum and Stevens held a card issued by the State of 
' Utah, with their seal thereon embossed, declaring 
Stevens was an agent or salesman for Ketchum. 
How can the rule of "UNDISiCLO·SED· PRINCI-
pAL" be involved in view of these facts. It is not 
possible to have an "undisclosed principal" under Utah 
Real Estate Broker statute. 
Wilkerson certainly dealt with Stevens as a "sales-
tnan" even though she never knew about Ketchum. In 
view of that relationship, then the provisions of the 
Utah R.eal estate brokers statute must be read into these 
proceedings. The whole purpose of that statute is to 
protect the public, and to hold broker and salesman 
equally responsible to the public. 
61-2.-1 provides that it is unlawful to operate without 
a license. 
61.-2-5 that Securities commiSSion be given exten-
sive power and control over brokers and salesmen. It 
requires that brokers vouch for salesmen's integrity, 
and the broker must furnish bond, to protect the public. 
The statute does not require a salesman bond. Pre-
sumably the legislature intended to hold the broker as 
the responsible party. 
61-2-7 provides that after they a.re satisfied as to 
the salesman's qualifications and honPsty, that they issue 
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him a license, with their seal attached, and the broker is 
given a similar license to be displayed in his office. 
61-2-8 provides that if the salesman's employment is 
terminated, the broker must immediately notify the 
"'Commission," return the license they hold, and the 
salesman cannot thereafter sell. Nor can a salesman be 
employed by more than one broker at a time. 
61-2-9. To further effect control over brokers and 
salesmen, this section provides the licenses must be re-
newed each year. If the broker loses his license, then 
all salesmen, licensed under him, immediately lose their 
licenses. 
61-2.-10 provides that a salesman cannot accept a 
commission, except from his employer, the broker. Again 
stressing the control of broker over salesman. This 
section uses the word "unlawful". 
61-2-11 lists grounds for revocation. Included are 
( 4) actjng for more than one broker; (5) failing to ac-
count for money coming into his possession; (9) failing 
to furnish all parties with copies of papers drawn; (10) 
keep records for three years ; ( 11) failure to make full 
disclosure, including undisclosed principal. (Incidently, 
Stevens apparently violated every provision.) 
61-2-14 requires conunission to prepare and mail to 
all county clerks, serni-annually, a list of brokers and 
salesmen, and furnish a copy to anyone, on request. 
61-2'-17 provides for penalties including fine and 
jail. 
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61-~-20 says a salesman can fill out all forms, in-
cluding receipts. If the salesman can issue a receipt, 
presumably he would be entitled to receive money. 
In view of the extended nature of this statute it 
seerns apparent a broker and salesman are one, and the 
broker by this statute is responsible for his salesman's 
conduct. 
With all the provisions to make public the relation 
of broker and salesman, it seems inconceivable that the 
question of "undisclosed principal'' can be factually a 
part of any contract wherein either salesman or broker 
are parties. It is not possible to conceal the relationship 
of principal and agent. 
In the annotations to 118 A.L.R. 682, at page 684, 
this appears, "(15) Everyone in a state is bound to know 
the existence and terms of a general law of the state." 
The general law is made part of every contract. At page 
705, the Court said all parties are charged with know-
ledge of the statute. 
At page 696 the ·Court said that a principal and 
agent ~'constitute but one party to the contract." 
It is Appellant's contention that there can be no 
such thing as an "undisclosed principal'' under the Utah 
real estate broker statute, and to so hold, means that 
the Court must entirely ignore the intent and purpose 
of the statute. 
This Court should properly hold, that there can be 
no such thing as an "undisclosed principal'' as far a~ 
broker and salesman are concerned. 
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POINT 5. 
THE RIGHT TO CLAIM AN ELECTION IS WAIVED 
BY FAILURE TO DE~/.fAND AN ELECTION IN LOWER 
COURT. 
All through this proceeding, Plaintiff proceeded on 
th~ theory she could have judgment against both broker 
and salesman, but limited to one recovery. 
Defendant Ketchum in his AnsweT, interrogatory, 
memorandum of authorities, argument before Judge 
Jeppson, and before Judge Ellett at pre-trial, based his 
entire defense on no knowled~e on the part of Ketchum, 
and no reliance on Ketchum, and agent acted beyond the 
scope of his authority. In D·efendant Ketchum's Answer, 
'·'Fourth Defense" he alleges that Ketchum had no know-
ledge of the deal; that Ketchum did not participate; that 
Stevens acted in his own behalf; that Stevens acted 
beyond the scope of his authority. 
The Ketchum affidavit in support of motion for 
summary judgment in paragraph 3, stated that :Stevens 
did not list the transaction with Ketchum, and at 5, that 
St.evens was acting in his O"\Vn behalf. Ketchum's 
"M.emorandum" furnished Judge Jeppson, stated that at 
no time was Ketchum discl<;>sed, discussed, or relied 
upon. Quoting . from that memorandum, first page~ 
"ISS·UE'" "Whether or not a principal whose identity 
is undisclosed and not reiled upon is liable for the acts 
of its agent not within the scope of his authority and 
actng in his own behalf." 
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The memorandum is directed entirely to this issue, 
and "election" is never mentioned, nor is the Costello 
case cited. 
In the judgment prepared by Draper, the basis is on 
lack of knowledge by Ketchum, no disclosure, discussion 
or reliance on Ketchum, and that Stevens acted on his 
own. There was not one word as to "election". In the 
Hfindings" later prepared by Draper at the request of 
Plaintiff, and signed by Judge Ellett, (2) Stevens acted 
on his own, without knowledge of Ketchum. (3) At no 
time was Ketchum disclosed or relied upon by Plaintiff, 
nor did Ketchum participate in the transaction. 
Again, not one word in relation to "election". 
The principal of the ~Costello case as to "election" 
was first introduced in Ketchum's respondents brief. 
Judge Ellett signed the "Findings" and "judgment" 
as prepared. Presumably they reflect his basis for the 
decision. There was not one word in either of these 
documents, suggesting an "election". At no time in all 
these proceedings was there a discussion, suggestion, 
request, or demand for an "election". 
Plaintiff's Counsel admits ignorance of the Costello 
case, until it was pointed out in Respondent's brief. 
Plaintiff contends that (1) The failure to demand 
an election in the lower Court, waived that right; and 
(2) The question of election, cannot be raised for thP 
first time on appeal. 
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This Court apparently bottoins its decision on Cos-
tello vs. Kastler, 7 Utah 2nd 310; 324 Pacific 2nd 772, 
which in turn, relies heavily on 118 A.L.R. 682. 
Appellant draws the ·Court's attention to these 
points from those two cases : 
In the 'Costello case at page 773, the Court said, 
"Ordinariy Plaintiff would not he entitled to judgment 
against both. However, App·ellants did not demand or 
move for an election by Respondents, as to whether the 
principal or agent should be held and the failure to do 
so was a waiver." 
In the A.L.R. case, John D. Hospelhorn, Receiver, 
et al vs. Philip L. Poe, et al, Maryandl :Court of Appeals, 
April 21, 1938, 118 A.L.R. 682 ,after pointing out the 
principal and agent could be joined as parties D'efendant, 
in the annotations at page 705, it state, "If both Defend-
ants ate found to be liable . . . then the Court should 
direct an election be made and enter judgment accord-
ingly." 
At page 707, this appears, "If he sues both, however, 
the only remedy of Defendants is by motion to compel 
him to ele-ct." At the same page, "B. Waiver of right to 
compel election." ''It has been held that the rule that 
the Plaintiff before the· close of the case must elect 
whether he will take judgment against the one or the 
other is subject to an exception, or modification, which 
holds that the right to compel an election is waived by 
failure to demand or Inove for that remedy during the 
eourse of the trial." (A California case) 
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Again at page 707, also a ·C·alifornia decision, this is 
stated, "'So, where ... judgment is entered against them 
jointly, ... \vithout raising the question of an election 
by demurrer, motion, demand, or otherwise the right to 
compel an election is thereby waived and may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal." 
In a New York decision, this is quoted at page 707-
708, "Where Plaintiff sues both . . . where Plaintiff's 
1notion for judgment on the pleadings against the agent 
was granted by the trial Court at the opening of the 
trial, the principal could have then insisted that Plaintiff 
had made an election binding on him to hold the agent 
only, and a motion for dismissal of the complaint as 
against the remaining Defendant, if made, must have 
been granted; however, the Appellate ;Court was of the 
opinion that no such motion was made, either then or 
thereafter, and no request made that the ~Court so hold, 
the point was waived." 
Plaintiff submits, the question of "election" was 
never raised in the lower Court. 
POINT 6. 
THE QUESTION OF "ELECTION" CANNOT BE RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The rule has long been established, that a p·oint can-
not be raised for the first time on appeal. ~The Court 
reiterates that position in the ,c·ostello case, and aga1n 
in the A.L.R. case at page 707, see above quote. 
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POINT 7. 
IF THE FOREGOING ARE NOT PERSUASIVE, THEN 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOW BE GIVEN THE RIGHT 
TO "ELECT" TO PROCEED AS TO KETCHUM. 
If any or all of the above is not persuasive, then 
Plaintiff requests the privilege to now dismiss the worth-
less judgment against Stevens, and proceed to trial as 
to Ketchum. 
Plaintiff's counsel wishes to point out, the Costello 
case was not familiar to him until presented on appeal. 
·Certainly had we been obliged to elect in the lower Court, 
we would not have elected Stevens, who was out of the 
jurisdiction and judgment proof. We were never asked 
to elect. We took the Stevens judgment to clear the case 
for appeal. 
The current decision says, "She took judgment 
against ·Stevens, and the lower Court dismissed the ac-
tion as to Ketchum." Again, in the last line of the deci-
sion, ". . . the complainant 1nust make an election as to 
which he chooses to hold responsible. Such an election 
has been made in this case." 
Plaintiff contends that the record shows judgment 
was given as to Ketchum first, and a month later the 
judgment was signed as to Stevens. 'The inference from 
the opinion was judgment was first given as to Stevens. 
Plaintiff further contends that in view of the above 
cases, that to the Court's ruling here that Plaintiff must 
elect, should be added the words, if de1nand is so made. 
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Plaintiff further contends that no demand was ever 
made, nor did she ever make an election. 
In the Costello case, no election was made, and on 
appeal, this Court said at page 773, "Since the respond-
ent in his brief has stated that if the ~Court should find 
that he is not entitled to judgment against both appel-
lants then he requests that he be allowed to make his 
election in this 1Court and chooses to hold the agent 
Kastler. We deem it proper to grant the request." At 
page 777, the Court said, "Affirmed with instructions 
to vacate the judgment against appellant lTranium 
Chemical Corporation." 
In the A..L.R .. case, annotations, page 708, a Texas 
decision, this is stated, "Judgment as to both. Both could 
not be held." And then this, "It was further held that 
the Plaintiff would in the appellate 1Court be allowed to 
elect to hold the agent and dismiss as to the principal, 
that the Court stating that this right should be accorded 
for two reasons ; in the first place the record showed the 
Plaintiff was entitled to judgment against either De.-
fendant he might choose to hold, and not having been 
theretofore called upon to make his election, he should 
be pe-rmitted now to do so; ... ". 
If elect we must, then we ask permission now to 
elect Ketchum. 
POINT 8. 
ASSUMING THAT STEVENS HAD NOT RECEIVED 
PAYMENT, BUT HAD COMPLETED THE DEAL, AND 
THEN SENT KETCHUM ALL PAPERS, COULD KETCHUM 
RECOVER COMMISSION ON SALE? 
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This question is posed, since it has bothered Plain-
tiff's counsel all during the proceedings. Judge 'C'rockett 
broaches the same, in saying that if the principal, though 
undisclosed, received the benefits, he could be held joint-
ly with the salesman. 
Put another way, suppose Stevens, acting clearly 
within the scope of his authority, obtained a buyer for 
Plaintiff, all papers signed and deal closed. Ketchum 
was never mentioned. Then Stevens sends all documents 
to Ketchum, who learns about it for the first time. His 
agent has performed the service, the broker is entitled 
undeT the statute to sue for the commission. 
How far would Wilkerson get, in a defense of un-
disclosed principal~ It seems to Plaintiff to he a two 
way street. If undisclosed principal could recover com-
mission, when apprised of facts, then Wilkerson in turn 
should recover from undisclosed principal. 
1. 'That the rule of "undisclosed principal" has no 
application where a licensed broker and a licensed sales-
man are involve-d in the transaction 
2. That the right to have an election made, was 
neveT demanded, and therefor waived. 
3. !The question of an election cannot be raised for 
the first time on appeal. 
4. That the Court should pass upon the issues 
raised in Plaintiff's brief as to the liability of Ketchum 
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as principal, and the 1natter sent back to determine that 
liability, and give Plaintiff her day in ~Court. 
5. In a final alternate, that Plaintiff be peTmitted 
novv to elect to proceed aganst Ketchum, dismiss her 
judgrnent as to Stevens, and the matter returned to the 
lovver court for determination of Ketchum's liability. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROY F. TYGE·SON 
Attorney for Appellant 
2968 South 86.50 West, Magna 
P.O. Box 206, Phone 297-6711 
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